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THE MONEY CHASE: HOW PROPOSED 
CHANGES TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 
COULD IMPACT FEMALE CANDIDATES 
JASON P. CONTI* 
MADAM PRESIDENT: SHATIERING THE LAST GlASS CEILING. 
By Eleanor Clift & Tom Brazaitis. New York: Scribner. 2000. Pp. 324. 
Abstract: In their book, Madam President: Shattering the Last Glass Ceiling, 
Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis shed light on the various reasons why a 
woman has yet to ascend the political ladder and occupy the Oval 
Office. While the authors do include some mention of female 
candidates' difficulty with fundraising, the authors fail to address a key 
component of any political analysis: Campaign finance reform. 
Reforming the federal election laws could have a profound influence 
on the prospects of current and future female politicians. Two reform 
proposals, including banning qr restricting soft money and banning or 
restricting the practice of bWldling, have consistently appeared on the 
short list of suggested changes to campaign finance laws. This Book 
Review explores these reform proposals and explains why banning soft 
money or bundling would take away two essential sources of campaign 
funds for women, thereby hindering their ability to rise through the 
political ranks. 
In their book, Madam President: Shattering the Last Glass Ceiling, 
Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis use contemporary female politicians 
to chronicle the difficulties of women in politics, particularly the 
difficulty of a woman ascending to the presidency. 1 The authors 
chronicle the recent failures of female candidates, including Eliza-
beth Dole's (R) aborted bid for the 2000 Republican nomination and 
Geraldine Ferraro's (D) fall following her 1984 Democratic vice-
presidential nomination, to highlight the challenges female candi-
dates face in their pursuit of higher office.2 In addition, the authors 
parse the resumes and future prospects of current high-ranking fe-
male politicians, from Arizona Governor Jane Hull (R) to California 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COllEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2000-2001). 
1 See general(v ELEANOR CLIrr & TOM BRAZAITIS, MADAM PRESIDENT: SHATTERING THE 
LAST GLASS CEILING (2000). 
2 See id. at 62-84, 143-61. 
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Senator Dianne Feinstein (D), ultimately concluding that because of 
the hurdles female candidates face, both Hull and Feinstein as well as 
most other current female politicians, are not likely to wind up in the 
OvalOffice.3 
The authors briefly acknowledge that one major setback for fe-
male candidates is their difficulty raising money.4 Harriett Woods' (D) 
near-defeat of incumbent John Danforth (R) in the 1982 Senate race 
in Missouri is an apt illustration.5 The authors also detail the success 
of Emily's List, a group that funds pro-choice Democratic women 
running for office, explaining that an endorsement from the group 
goes a long way in legitimizing a female candidate and improving her 
chances for election.6 Unfortunately, the authors' discussion of female 
candidates' fundraising difficulties fails to raise the subject of cam-
paign finance reform.' In an age in which campaign finance reform 
receives considerable press, and in which various proposals as to how 
to alter the system sit on Capitol Hill, the authors' omission of an as-
sessment of these proposed changes and, in particular, their effect on 
female candidates, is notable.s 
Proposals abound for ways to alter campaign finance laws.9 Two 
proposed changes-banning or restricting soft money and banning or 
3 Seeid. at 19, 141-42, 176-77. 
4 See id. at 24-25, 87. 
5 See id. at 86-87. The authors note that "party leaders had so little confidence in [Sen-
ate candidate Harriett Woods] that she received only token financial help. A woman run-
ning for the Senate was such an oddity in 1982 that the mostly male leadership could get 
away with their cavalier attitude.» Id. at 87. 
6 See CLIFT & BRAZAITIS. supra note 1, at 108-09; Elizabeth Schwinn, Loblry Laws: 
Women May Win an Exemption, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 31, 1993, at A1O. 
Clift and Brazaitis explain that the decision by Emily's List in 1992 to back Ferraro over 
another female candidate, Elizabeth Holtzman, for the Democratic party's Senate nomina-
tion in New York was a huge boon for Ferraro and a damaging setback for Holtzman. See 
CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1, at 108-09. 
7 See generally CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1. 
8 See Hans Johnson, Cleaning Up: Missouri, Oregon Consider Campaign Finance Initiatives, 
IN THESE TIMES (Chi.), Sept. 4, 2000, at 3 (detailing plans for major campaign finance 
initiatives in two states that would establish public funding similar to the system already 
established in Maine); Proposals at a Glance, ROLL CALL (Washington, D.C.), May 28,1998 
(detailing numerous bills that deal with campaign finance reform). See generally CLIFT & 
BRAZAITIS, supra note 1. Given the fact that campaign finance reform proposals exist on a 
state and national level, it seems as though a book focusing on elective office and the 
difficulty of raising money would mention such reform proposals. See generally CLIFT & 
BRAZAITIS, supra note 1. 
9 S. 27, 107th Congo (2001); S. 2941, 106th Congo (2000); S. 26, 106th Congo (1999); S. 
1816, 106th Congo (1999); H.R. 4037, 106th Congo (2000); H.R. 417, 106th Congo (1999); 
H.R. 1739, 106th Congo (1999); H.R. 2866, 106th Congo (1999); Proposals at a Glance, supra 
note 8 (detailing numerous bills that deal with campaign finance reform). 
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severely restricting the practice of bundling-would negatively affect 
challenger candidates.l° Since few women hold federal elective office, 
most female candidates tend to be challengers. ll Women are, there-
fore, most susceptible to the effects of these proposed changes to 
10 See S. 27; Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, 
Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 598, 608 (2000); Richard Briffault, The Political Parties 
and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 652 (2000); Fred Wertheimer & 
Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restming the Health of Our Democracy, 
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1126, 1128 (1994). Soft money is money that can be collected by politi-
cal parties and is not subject to a cap; bundling involves a group soliciting donations on 
behalf of a candidate and then presenting the money to the candidate in a lump sum. See 
id. at 1140-41, 1144; Geoffrey M. Wardle, Note, Political Contributions and Conduits after 
Charles Keating and EMILY's List: An Incremental Approach to Reforming Federal Campaign Fi-
nance, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 531, 573 (1996); Gail Collins, Why the Women Are Fading 
Away, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 54; Proposals at a Glance, supm note 8. 
11 Mary Lynn F. Jones, A Big Leap Year; Women Candidates CaptU1'e Greatest Number of Seats 
Since 1992, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2000, at 3 [hereinafter Jones, Leap Yem]; Mary Leonard, 
Tmnsfer of Power/The Female Contingent; Women's Status Grvws in Senate, Legislators Hope 
Influence Expands with Larger Presence, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 2001, at A28. Mter the 2000 
election, there were a total of five female governors, thirteen female senators and sixty-<>ne 
House members, which includes fifty-nine voting members, and two non-voting delegates 
from the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Jones, Leap Year, supra, at 3; 
Leonard, supra, at A28; CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS, EAGLETON INST. OF POLITICS, 
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIV. OF Nj., ELECTION 2000: SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR WOMEN, at 
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/-cawp/facts/Summary2000.html [hereinafter cited as ELEC-
TION 2000]. Although there were five female governors after the 2000 election, that num-
ber did not last long: Governor Christine Todd Whitman (R) of New Jersey left her guber-
natorial post before her term ended to serve as head of the Environmental Protection 
Agency in the Bush administration. See David M. Halbfinger, DiFmncesco Sworn in as Acting 
Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at B5; Glen Johnson, A Divided Panel Backs Ashcroft, Key 
opponents of Bush Choice Hopingfor 40 Votes Tomorrow, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2001, at AI; 
ELECTION 2000, supra. With Whitman's departure, Senate President Donald T. Di-
Francesco (R) became the next governor of New Jersey, reducing the female gubernatorial 
total to four. See Halbfinger. supra, at B5. However, the number will return to five should 
Massachusetts Governor Paul Cellucci (R) be confirmed as the U.S. ambassador to Can-
ada, a post he was nominated for in February. See Frank Phillips & Anne E. Kornblut, The 
Cellucci Nomination; Cellucci Set to 'Serve the Country' Says He'll Leave Massachusetts in Good 
Hands, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14,2001, at AI. Cellucci, whose confirmation as ambassador, 
and thus resignation as governor, should come by the end of April, will be succeeded by 
Lieutenant Governor Jane M. Swift (R), the first female governor to serve in Massachu-
setts. See id. The numbers following the 2000 election represent an increase of two female 
governors, three female congresswomen and four senators over the number of women in 
office before the 2000 election. SeeJones, Leap Yem; supm, at 3; Leonard, supra, at A28. Clift 
and Brazaitis correctly note that in 2000 there were three female governors and nine 
women in the Senate. CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note I, at 17-18. However, the authors 
also claim tllere were "65 women among the 435 members of the House," a claim that is 
false.Id. at 18; see Jones, Leap lear, supra, at 3. In 2000, there were 56 voting members out 
of the 435 members of the House, not 65 as the authors suggest. CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra 
note I, at 18; seeJones, Leap lear, supra, at 3. 
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campaign finance.12 Part I of this Book Review provides an overview 
of the current laws governing campaign finance. Part II explains pro-
posed changes to soft money and applies those changes to the pros-
pects for challenger candidates, and by extension, female candidates. 
Part III assesses proposals to close the bundling loophole and its im-
pact on female candidates. This Book Review concludes that two 
popular proposed changes-banning soft money and the practice of 
bundling-would damage the prospects for challenger candidates 
and, in particular, female challenger candidates. 
I. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAw 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) , which Con-
gress heavily amended in 1974 in the post-Watergate era, governs fed-
eral campaign finance law.13 The current system sets specific per-
election limits on both individuals and political action committees 
(PACs) during an election cycle.14 Buckley v. Valeo, the 1976 watershed 
12 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 10, at 608; Briffault, supra note 10, at 652; 
Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 10, at 1128; Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11, at 3; 
Leonard, supra note 11, at A28; ELECTION 2000, supra note 11. 
13 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1997); Wardle, supra note 10, at 536-37. 
14 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a). An individual cannot contribute more than $1,000 to any candi-
date or authorized committee of the candidate with respect to any federal election. [d. 
Individuals can contribute up to $20,000 per year to political committees maintained by 
the national party. [d. Individuals can also contribute up to $5,000 a year to any other po-
litical committees, with a total contribution limit for individuals of $25,000 per year. [d. 
Multicandidate political committees shall not make contributions to any candidate or to 
their committee in any federal election that exceeds $5,000, and not more than $15,000 in 
a calendar year to any political committee maintained by a national party. Id. The term 
"multicandidate political committee" means "a political committee which has been regis-
tered under section 303 [U.S.C.S. § 433] for a period of not less than 6 months, which has 
received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except for any State political party 
organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal office." [d. 
§ 441a(a) (4). The term "election" with regard to the above statute is defined as: 
[A] general, special, primary, or runoff election; a convention or caucus of a 
political party which has authority to nominate a candidate; a primary elec-
tion held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention 
of a political party; and a primary election held for the expression of a pref-
erence for the nomination of individuals for election to the office of Presi-
dent. 
[d. § 431 (1)(A)-(D). This means, for instance, that the contribution limit of $1,000 per 
person to any given candidate per election allows a donor to give $1,000 in the primary 
and another $1,000 in the general election and in any special or runoff election that in-
cludes that candidate. See id.; 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a). Political action committees are multican-
didate political committees that do not have ties to the national parties or to a particular 
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U.S. Supreme Court case in the area of campaign finance law, upheld 
the individual contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provi-
sions of the Act, and the public financing scheme for presidential 
elections.I5 In contrast, the Court found limitations on campaign ex-
penditures, independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and 
limits on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds, to be 
unconstitutional. I6 The decision had a far-reaching and immediate 
impact on campaign fundingP The decision, in emphasizing contri-
bution limits but not a general cap on overall campaign expenditures, 
served as a catalyst for escalating campaign costs. IS The practical ef-
fect of the Buckley decision has been to put a greater emphasis on PAC 
contributions because of their $5,000 limit, as opposed to the $1,000 
limit for individuals, igniting an explosion in the number of PACS.I9 
candidate. KAREN O'CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, THE ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 336 (3d ed. 1998). 
15 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976). The Act requires each political commit-
tee to register with the Federal Election Commission and keep detailed records of contri-
butions and expenditures. 2 U.S.C. §§ 433, 432(c), (d). Each committee and candidate 
also must file quarterly reports with detailed financial information and personal informa-
tion of the donors. Id. § 434(a), (b). In general, the term "political committee" in the stat-
ute refers to: 
[AJny committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives 
contributions aggregating in excess of $1 ,000 during a calendar year or which 
makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year; 
or any separate segregated fund under the pl'ovisions of section 316(b) [2 
U.S.C.S. § 441b(b) J; or any local committee of a political party which receives 
contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or 
makes payments exempted from the definition of contribution or expendi-
ture as defined in section 301 (8) and (9) aggregating in excess of $5,000 dur-
ing a calendar year, or makes conu'ibutions aggregating in excess of $1,000 
during a calendar year or makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1 ,000 
during a calendar year. 
Id. § 431 (4)(A)-(C). 
16 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. 
17 Wardle, supra note 10, at 538. The Court, in Buckley, inadvertently "spawned a 
money chase that requires constant fundraising and continued reliance on wealthy do-
nors." Kenneth J. Levit, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v. Valeo, 103 
YALE LJ. 469, 473 (1993). 
18 See Levit, supra note 17, at 473. 
19 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a); O'CONNOR & SABATO, supra note 14, at 336. The number of 
PACs grew to 4,079 in 1996, more than six times the number in 1974, just two years before 
Buckley. O'CONNOR & SABATO, supra note 14, at 336; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra 
note 10, at 1131-32. The authors argue that Buckley, combined with the failure of the 1974 
reforms to include public financing, left candidates with no choice but to rely on special-
interest money. See Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 10, at 1132; Wardle, supra note 
10, at 539. 
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A. The Bundling Loophole 
One FECA provision, 2 u.S.C. § 441a(a) (8), and its accompany-
ing Federal Election Commission (FEC) interpretation, has enabled a 
growing number of PACs to raise large amounts of money for specific 
candidates that is not subject to the $5,000-per-candidate PAC limit.2o 
This loophole, known as bundling, requires certain reporting criteria 
for "earmarked" donations.21 Earmarked donations are those in which 
there is "a designation, instruction, or encumbrance, whether direct 
or indirect, express or implied, oral or written, which results in all or 
part of a contribution or expenditure being made to, or expended on 
behalf of, a clearly identified candidate or a candidate's authorized 
committee. "22 Reporting of such earmarked contributions requires 
that the conduit or intermediary report to the FEC and the recipient 
candidate the donor's name and mailing address, and for individuals 
making contributions over $200, their occupation and employer.23 
The recipient then must report any conduit that provided one or 
more earmarked contribution over $200, the total amount of contri-
butions from the conduit, and the information identifying individuals 
giving more than $200.24 
The FEC regulations alter this structure if it is determined that 
the conduit exercised "direction or control" over the choice of the 
recipient candidate; if no "direction or control" exists, then there is 
no effect on the conduit's contribution limit to the candidate; how-
ever, if the FEC determines there was "any direction or control," the 
contribution will count against the limits of both the individual and 
the conduit.25 The term "direction or control," however, appears 
meaningless in light of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals de-
20 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2) (A), (8); Wardle, supra note 10, at 535. The statute states: 
For purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all contributions 
made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular can-
didate, including contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise 
directed through an intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be 
treated as contributions from such person to such candidate. The intermedi-
ate or conduit shall report the original source and the intended recipient of 
such contribution to the Commission and to the intended recipient. 
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (8). 
21 See id.; FEC Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Prohibitions, 11 C.F.R. 
§ 110.6 (2000); Wardle, supra note 10, at 535. 
2211 C.F.R. § 110.6(b) (1). 
23 Id. § 1l0.6(c) (1) (i) (iv) (A). 
24 Id. § 110.6(c) (2) (i)-(ii). 
25 Id. § 110.6(d) (1)-(2). 
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clslOn in Federal Election Commission v. National Republican Senatorial 
Committee, in which the court found no "direction or control" when a 
national party helped a small, defined number of candidates.26 In this 
case, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) pre-
selected four 1986 Senate candidates and proceeded to solicit dona-
tions on their behalf.27 The Committee sent out letters saying it would 
divide the money equally among four candidates, only giving their 
states and not their names.28 The court said this was not "direction or 
control."29 Since this decision, there has been an increase in the 
number of political interest organizations that have supported federal 
candidates by bundling.3o This loophole has been one target of pro-
ponents of campaign finance reform. 31 
B. The Soft Money Loophole 
Another loophole that reformers target arose out of the 1979 
amendments to FECA, which Congress amended to include regula-
tions that exclude state and local party building activities from the 
federal contribution limits.32 The Federal Election Commission has 
since decided the 1979 amendments allow individuals and organiza-
tions to give unlimited amounts of money to the national parties' state 
and local party building campaign accounts.33 The money-referred 
to as soft money-is generally supposed to be used for party building 
expenditures at the state and local levels, and cannot be spent in con-
junction with federal candidates.34 Soft money provides a vehicle 
26 See 966 F.2d 1471, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Wardle, supra note 10, at 541-42. 
27 Nat 'I Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d at 1473. 
28Id. 
29 See id. at 1478. 
30 Wardle, supra note 10, at 558. 
31 See Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donar Anonymity to Dis-
rupt the Market far Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REv. 837, 869 (1998). The authors' pro-
posal for mandated donor anonymity would "effectively outlaw bundling" by keeping PACs 
from getting the credit for soliciting the donations. See id. at 869-70; Wertheimer & Weiss 
Manes, supra note 10, at 1128; Wardle, supra note 10, at 573; Proposals at a Glance, supra 
note 8. The article gives an overview of various campaign finance-related bills in the 105th 
Congress, listing Representative Sam Farr's (D-Cal.) measure which would ban bundling, 
among other things. Proposals at a Glance, supra note 8. 
32 Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 10, at 598; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra 
note 10, at 1128. 
33 Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 10, at 598. Because the 1979 amendments ex-
cluded state and local party-building expenditures from contribution limits, contributors 
can give unlimited amounts of money to the national parties' state and local party-building 
accounts, dubbed "non-federal" accounts. Id. 
34Id. 
112 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 21:105 
through which wealthy individuals and groups can help influence pol-
icy by contributing unlimited amounts of cash to the national par-
ties.35 Soft money has grown increasingly more influential in elections 
across the country, growing at an exponential rate from 1992 to 1996 
and from 1996 to 2000.36 
Both political parties have turned to "issue advocacy" as another 
means of utilizing soft money.37 Issue advocacy ads, which advocate or 
oppose the cause of a candidate, can be partially paid for with a 
party's soft money so long as they do not contain "magic words," in-
cluding ''vote for," "elect," "cast your ballot for," "vote against," or "de-
feat. "38 Through this new method, parties have increased the useful-
ness of soft money and now can use these funds to pay for ads that 
directly aid federal candidates.39 Because of the potential for abuse, 
and the significant increase in donations of this variety, soft money 
has become one of the largest targets of campaign finance reform.40 
II. THE EFFECTS OF BANNING SOFT MONEY ON FEMALE CANDIDATES 
Commentators and reform-minded politicians attack the heavy 
role of the two major political parties through the use of soft money, 
arguing that "parties [through soft money and other mechanisms] are 
35 See id. at 601. The authors explain that soft money opponents believe that because 
the donations are so large, they may influence policy by putting pressure on congressmen, 
senators and the president of a particular party to adhere to the wishes of a large donor. 
Seeid. 
36 See Alison Mitchell, Bush and McCain Meet on CampailfTt Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2001, at A20. The 2000 election found the parties raising the highest amounts of soft 
money ever, with the Democrats' party committees taking in $243.1 million and the Re-
publicans collecting $244.4 million, for a total of $487.5 million. [d. In 1996, the two na-
tional political parties raised $263 million, nearly three times as much as was raised in 
1992. Steve Campbell, CampailfTt System Riddled with Loapholes; They Render Existing Finance 
Restrictions VirtuaUy Meaningless, THE PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Me.), Sept. 16, 1997, at lAo 
37 See Briffault, supra note 10, at 632-33. 
38 [d. at 631-32. The author notes that an FEC Advisory Opinion in 1995 that allowed 
the Republican National Committee to criticize President Clinton by name while discuss-
ing issues led to the widespread use of such "issue" advertising in the 1996 election. [d. at 
632. The Advisory Opinion also stipulated that issue advocacy ads cannot be paid for ex-
clusively through soft money; only a specified portion of the cost can be funded through 
soft money, a ruling that is being challenged in the courts by both parties, but has not yet 
been resolved. [d. at 633. 
39 [d. 
40 See S. 27, 107th Congo (2001); S. 1816, 106th Congo (1999); S. 26, 106th Congo 
(1999); H.R. 417, 106th Congo (1999); Briffault, supra note 10, at 633; Wertheimer & Weiss 
Manes, supra note 10, at 1128. 
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eroding the basic elements of our campaign finance system. "41 While 
those same commentators will admit that the parties play a pivotal 
role in elections and should continue to do so, the use of soft money 
is seen by many to be in need of reform.42 As a result, many are calling 
for the effective ban of soft money by subjecting all party money used 
in federal elections to regulation.43 Senators John McCain (R) of Ari-
zona and Russell Feingold (D) of Wisconsin have put forth one of the 
more popular, much touted, reform plans that would ban soft 
money.44 Their proposed legislation would eliminate soft money by 
subjecting all party money to the limitations, prohibitions and regula-
tions established in FECA.45 Although this legislation has been pro-
posed and has failed in past years, the McCain-Feingold bill has 
gained supporters since its last defeat and has a better chance of pas-
sage in 2001.46 
41 See Briffault, supra note 10, at 652 (stating that limits on party spending for a candi-
date might as well not exist because they can easily be circumvented). 
42 See ill. at 653. 
45 See id. at 659; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 10, at 1128; Proposals at a 
Glance, supra note 8. Soft money has long been on the legislative agenda: In the 105th 
Congress, Representatives Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Martin T. Meehan (D-Mass.) 
proposed a bill to prohibit national parties from raising and spending soft money among 
other things (the House counterpart to the McCain-Feingold bill in the Senate); Repre-
sentative Charlie Bass' (R-N.H.) bill would ban national parties from raising soft money; 
Representative Sam Farr's (D-Cal.) bill would ban soft money; Representatives Asa 
Hutchinson (R-Ark.) and Tom Allen's (D-Me.) bill would prohibit national parties from 
raising and spending soft money; former Representative Vince Snowbarger's (R-Kan.) bill 
would prohibit any soft-money donations from unions and corporations to political party 
committees; and Rep. John F. Tierney'S (D-Mass.) bill would ban soft money. See Proposals 
at a Glance, supra note 8. 
44 SeeS. 27. 
45 Id. at Title I, § 101. If passed, the proposed legislation would amend FECA to in-
. c1ude: 
Id. 
(1) IN GENERAL-A national committee of a political party (including a na-
tional congressional campaign committee of a political party) may not solicit, 
receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of 
funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to 
tlle limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. 
46 See Larry Bivins, Tlwmpson PushRs Bill Banning 'Soft Money'; Bipartisan Support Could 
Expedite Vote on RPjorm, THE ThNNESSEAN (Nashville),Jan. 23, 2001, at 6A. With the addi-
tional support of senators like Republican Thad Cochran of Mississippi, a previous oppo-
nent of the bill, the legislation has a better chance of passage in 2001. See id. In addition, 
Republican Senator Fred Thompson (Tenn.) recently stated, '''We have a better chance 
than ever before to get something done.'" Id. (quoting Senator Thompson); Mitchell, 
supra note 36, at A20. Mitchell notes that the House version of tlIe bill has passed in that 
body two years in a row, but has "repeatedly died in a Senate filibuster." Mitchell, supra 
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While soft money has been used by both political parties to help 
many different kinds of candidates, a ban on such funds likely would 
have the most serious impact on challengers.47 In general, incumbents 
have an easier time than challengers in raising money and therefore 
would not be as adversely affected if soft money were to dry Up.48 In 
fact, some argue that reducing the fundraising abilities of the political 
parties would reduce challenger vote shares in the electoral process, 
mainly because non-incumbents have a much easier time attracting 
party money than they have attracting PAC money.49 
Challengers have a particularly difficult time raising adequate 
funds to mount competitive campaigns.5o Compared to both indi-
viduals and PACs, parties are much more likely to invest in challeng-
ers because parties are trying to spread their money strategically to 
either gain control or maintain control of Congress. 51 If soft money 
were to be banned, parties would be greatly restricted in their ability 
to help these challenger candidates, thus drying up an essential 
source of campaign funds.52 Therefore, a ban on soft money would 
affect challengers more than incumbents.53 
A dearth of females hold elective office today: Although there 
were increases following the 2000 election, only five female governors, 
thirteen female senators and sixty-one female House members held 
office at the beginning of 2001.54 This represents a severe numerical 
note 36, at A20. It takes sixty votes to break a filibuster; McCain says he now has enough 
votes to break a possible filibuster this year. Id. 
47 SeeAnsolabehere & Snyder, supra note 10, at 608; Briffault, supra note 10, at 661. 
48 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 10, at 608; Briffault, supra note 10, at 661. 
49 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 10, at 608,611. Although the authors admit 
that a large reduction in party money would reduce challenger vote shares by 2.5%, they 
conclude this would not "change competition in the national elections appreciably" be-
cause the typical challenger only receives 35% of the vote. See id. at 611. However, one 
could argue a 2.5% vote loss could impact some challengers in tight elections. See id. As 
Clift and Brazaitis point out, challenger candidate Harriett Woods lost by a mere 27,000 
votes to incumbent John Danforth in the 1982 Missouri Senate race in which she received 
inadequate party support; 2.5% certainly would have helped her win the race since she lost 
by about 1 %. See CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1, at 87. 
50 See Briffault, supra note 10, at 660. 
51 See id. at 661. 
52 See id. 
53 SeeAnsolabehere & Snyder, supra note 10, at 608; Briffault, supra note 10, at 660-61. 
54 Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11, at 3; Leonard, supra note 11, at A28; ELECTION 2000, 
supra note 11. The number of female governors quickly dropped to four following the 
2000 election because of the departure of New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman 
(R) to head the Environmental Protection Agency. See Halbfinger, supra note 11, at B5; 
Johnson, supra note 11, at AI. However, the number will return to five should Massachu-
setts Governor Paul Cellucci (R) be confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Canada; he would be 
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inequality in each chamber of Congress and in the governors' man-
sions across the country.55 For these numbers to improve, more fe-
male challengers will have to either win open seats or beat incum-
bents.56 However, in order to do this, female candidates will have to 
overcome historically great odds and raise a significant amount of 
money, an element of running for office that former California Secre-
tary of State March Fong Eu (D) once called, "the greatest barrier to 
the election of more women."57 Therefore, because female candidates 
are underrepresented, and tend to be under-funded challenger can-
didates in need of party support, banning soft money would have a 
negative impact on female candidates. 58 
For these reasons, many female candidates and female political 
operatives oppose the elimination of soft money.59 One high-profile 
example of this general view was on display in the 2000 New York 
Senate race in which Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton faced Repub-
lican Rick Lazio.6o While Mrs. Clinton is a somewhat unusual case 
study for campaign finance and female candidates in general because 
of her high name recognition and ability to incite strong feelings in 
voters, her agreement to ban groups from using soft money to buy 
advertising, although perhaps a helpful political strategy, was seen as 
potentially financially dangerous.61 The New York Times noted that 
succeeded by Lieutenant Governor Jane M. Swift (R). See Phillips & Kornblut, supra note 
11, at AI. 
55 See Leonard, supra note II, at A28. The 13 women out of a total of 100 senators and 
the 59 voting congresswomen out of a total of 435 members is very far from being on par 
with the U.S. population: fifty percent of the country is comprised of women. See id. The 
U.S., when compared to governments around the world, ranks fiftieth in women elected to 
office.ld. 
56 See id. 
57 See Doug Brown, Women in Politics; Candidates Face Money Problems, L.A. TIMES, June 
27,1986, at I (quoting March Fong Eu). 
58 See CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note I, at 141-42; Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 
10, at 608; Briffault, supra note 10, at 660-6I;Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11, at 3; Leonard, 
supra note II, at A28. 
59 See Pat Swift, Gender Gap Plays a Role in Campaign Funding, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 
18, 2000, at 7C. The article details the challenges of female candidates in raising money to 
run for elective office. See id. The author notes that "women's views of campaign finance 
reform are colored by their preference for fund raising networks and issue groups. They 
tend to oppose eliminating soft money contributions." Id. 
60 SeeCliffordJ. Levy, 'Soft Money' Ban Called a Problem for Mrs. Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
22, 2000, at AI. 
61 See id.; Dean E. Murphy, Candidates Back 'Soft Money' Ban in New York Roce, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 24, 2000, at 1. The deal included a ban on television and radio advertising paid for by 
political parties with soft money. See id. In addition, both sides agreed to ask independent 
groups not to advertise on each candidate's behalf. See id. 
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Clinton, in accepting the ban, "said her campaign would suffer be-
cause of the ban. . . . 'Well, I made a commitment to this principle 
over a year ago, and disadvantaged or not, I will honor it because it is 
the right thing to do."'62 Because of Lazio's greater ability to attract 
hard money campaign donations from across the country by running 
against the much-maligned First Lady, the soft-money ban left even 
this famous female candidate scrambling for cash like many other fe-
male candidates.63 
Clift and Brazaitis, while highlighting the difficulty for female 
candidates in attracting campaign donations, fail to address the fur-
ther difficulty female candidates for the House and Senate-impor-
tant positions in the line to the presidency-would face should a ban . 
on soft money become a reality.64 
III. THE EFFECTS OF BANNING OR RESTRICTING BUNDLING ON FEMALE 
CANDIDATES 
Banning bundling has not occurred very often in the states; only 
three states, Oregon, Missouri and Washington, have banned bun-
dling outright through ballot initiatives.65 However, banning bundling 
by PACs (or at least significant restrictions on the practice) is a popu-
lar idea for those advocating a reform of the current campaign 
finance system.66 Past bills in Congress that have attempted to address 
the issue of bundling have failed.67 The I03d Congress attempted to 
regulate the practice of bundling: Senate Bill 3 (S. 3) proposed a ban 
62 See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1 (quoting Hillary Clinton). 
63 See Levy, supra note 60, at AI; Adam Nagourney, Bush and Gore Vie for an Edge with 
Narrow Electoral Split; Hillary Clinton Goes to Senate; Big Victory for First Lady in Contest with 
Lazio, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8 2000, at AI. Despite the setback caused by the soft money ban, 
the First Lady won the election for Senate in New York on November 7, 2000. See Nagour-
ney, supra, at AI. 
64 See generally CLIFf & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1. The authors detail the troubles of rais-
ing money, especially the trouble Harriett Woods had in her bid to unseatJohn Danforth 
in the 1982 Missouri Senate race. See id. at 87. The authors acknowledge that because she 
lost by only 27,000 votes, more money could have made the difference. Id. The authors 
also note that women were angry that the Democratic Party did not fully support her can-
didacy. See id. Since that time the parties have become more active in supporting all candi-
dates, and a ban on soft money would return challengers, women included, to the position 
Woods was in with little party support. See id. 
65 Jennifer A. Moore, Note, Campaign Finance Reform in Kentucky: The RLlce for Governor, 
85 Ky. LJ. 723, 741 (1996-97). 
66 See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 31, at 869; Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 10, 
at 1128; Wardle supra note 10, at 573; Proposals at a Glance, supra note 8. 
67 SeeWardle, supra note 10, at 545-46. 
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on PACs and on bundling, but was unacceptable to the House.68 
House Bill 3 (H.R 3) regulated bundling but also contained an im-
portant exemption: political committees not engaged in lobbying ac-
tivities would have been exempt from the new bundling regulations.69 
The exemption was inserted to help Emily's List continue to raise 
money for female, Democratic, pro-choice women, because the group 
does not technically engage in lobbying.70 
Emily's List, mentioned throughout Clift and Brazaitis' book, is 
dedicated to raising money to help usher female politicians into elec-
tive office.71 To achieve this end, the group engages in the practice of 
bundling, soliciting money for candidates, combining the donations 
and then sending the money to candidates that the group endorses.72 
Ellen Malcolm, the group's founder, is a large proponent of bundling 
and pushed for the exemption for non-lobbying PACs in the 1993 
House legislation.73 Malcolm has gone as far as to claim that politi-
cians who support proposals to outlaw bundling are voting against 
women.74 
Some have suggested that the Emily's List exemption, had it 
passed, would have created a new loophole immediately, whereby 
most PACs could just rearrange themselves as non-lobbying PACs to 
circumvent the law.75 Indeed, some female political activists agree and 
do not support such exemptions.76 Margery Tabankin, former execu-
tive director of the Hollywood Women's Political Committee, says that 
bundling will not close the gap between female and male candidates, 
and instead advocates closing all the loopholes instead of partially 
closing only the bundling loophole.77 Fred Wertheimer and Susan 
Weiss Manes, former president and former vice president for issue 
development, respectively, of Common Cause, write, "The bundling 
loophole poses a serious threat to the integrity of existing federal con-
tribution limits .... "78 And professors Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow 
68 See id. at 548. 
69 See id. at 550-51. 
70 See id. 
7I See CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1, at 79. 
72 SeeJon Friedman, The Founding Mother, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 
50; Schwinn, supra note 6, at AI0. 
73 See Friedman, supra note 72, at 50. 
74 Bundling Makes Emily's List, LEGAL TIMES (Washington, D.C.), Apr. 26, 1993, at 5. 
75 See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 10, at 551. 
76 See Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 10, at 1142; Schwinn, supra note 6, at 
AIO. 
77 Schwinn, supra note 6, at AIO. 
78 Wertheimer & Weiss Manes, supra note 10, at 1126,1142. 
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contend that bundling "allows groups of individual contributors to 
buy access or influence. "79 
However, the more popular position among female activists is 
that cutting out bundling as an option for PACs without an exemption 
for non-lobbying PACs will have a disproportionately negative impact 
on female candidates.8o Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.), a 
former head of Emily's List and Herbert Alexander, former director 
of the Citizens Research Foundation at the University of Southern 
California, both strongly support the continuation of bundling.81 In 
addition, Malcolm wrote in a New York Times op-ed column that be-
cause groups like Emily's List are merely trying to help elect certain 
candidates, and not lobby these members once elected, such groups 
help open up the political system.82 Malcolm wrote, "'The last thing 
Emily's List wants is a loophole that would pour special-interest 
money into campaigns. That would take us back to the very system 
that kept women out of office. '''83 
Clift and Brazaitis certainly discuss Emily's List's participation in 
various elections, from Harriett Woods' 1986 Senate race in Missouri 
to Barbara Mikulski's (D) 1986 Senate race in Maryland.84 The 
authors discuss numerous other elections leading up to the group's 
present prowess, noting that by 1998 Emily's List had grown to 50,000 
members in fifty states with total contributions of $7.5 million, all of 
which helped elect seven new pro-choice Democratic women to the 
House in 1998.85 But despite the heavy mention of the group as hav-
ing "established itself as a player in American politics," the authors fail 
to address the practical result of campaign finance laws that would 
limit bundling, and by extension, Emily's List's ability to help female 
candidates.86 
Little question exists, given the nature of the fundraising by 
Emily's List and other groups like the Republican counterpart, 
79 Ayres & Bulow, supra note 31, at 869. 
80 Friedman, supra note 72, at 50; Schwinn, supra note 6, at AI0. 
81 See Schwinn, supra note 6, at AlO. DeLauro said the practice allows individual voices 
to be heard in Washington. Id. Alexander said, "I don't call it [bundling] a loophole. 
Blacks and women are underrepresented in Congress. They hit on a way of networking 
and now they're told, 'You can't do that.'" Id. 
82 Ellen R. Malcolm, Reining Big Givers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at A23. 
83Id. 
84 See CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1, at 88, 93. 
85 Id. at 99. This is the largest increase of Democratic women in the House in a non-
presidential election year. Id. 
86 Id. 
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Women in the House and Senate (WISH) List, that banning bundling 
would handicap these groupS.87 Some even have called the bundling 
loophole Emily's List's "life blood."88 Without Emily's List and simi-
larly minded groups' ability to generate funds, female candidates, who 
already struggle to raise enough campaign money, would be stripped 
of one of their few financial advantages and thereby would be placed 
in an even more unenviable position.89 Indeed, the 2000 election 
shows the continued strength of Emily's List: The group doled out 
almost nine million dollars to female candidates.90 
Proponents of a ban on bundling sometimes make the argument 
that because there have been numerous failed bids by female politi-
cians to upset incumbents, bundling has not enabled women to rise 
above the bias in the system.91 This argument has obvious flaws; the 
number of women elected has risen since Emily's List was founded, 
and the mere fact that the playing field for men and women is not 
equal in politics does not mean that this group's ability to donate 
heavily has no effect.92 Although this money is not the ultimate pana-
cea to cure the financial schism between male and female politicians, 
it has helped in slowly raising the number of women in elective 
87 See Wardle, supra note 10, at 565; Swift, supra note 59, at 7C. 
88 Bundling Makes Emily's List, supra note 74, at 5. The author notes that it is somewhat 
understandable that Emily's List would fight any legislation that would discontinue their 
ability to bundle donations given that this method of helping candidates is their life blood. 
Id. 
89 See Schwinn, supra note 6, at AIO. The author describes the bundling loophole as "a 
loophole that means big bucks for women candidates and others." Id.; Collins, supra note 
10, at 54; see also Brown, supra note 57, at 1. The author quotes former California Secretary 
of State March Fong Eu as saying, "'Male donors don't see women as politicians. They see 
women as wives who should be at home and not in politics. They often do this uncon-
sciously, but the bottom line is that they do not deal with female candidates in the same 
way that they do male candidates.'" Brown, supra note 57, at 1. 
90 Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11, at 3. 
91 See Wardle, supra note 10, at 565. 
92 SeeCLIIT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1, at 18-19, 91. Since 1969, the number of women 
in state legislatures has increased fivefold. Id. at 19. Also, when Barbara Mikulski was 
elected to the Senate from Maryland in 1986 (the first year of Emily's List), she became 
only the nineteenth woman to serve in the Senate in the country's 200-year history. Id. at 
91. At the beginning of 2001, there were thirteen women in the Senate. Collins, supra note 
10, at 54; Leonard, supra note 11, at A28; see also Mary Lynn F. Jones, Moving Up: 'Trailblaz-
ing' Panel Looks at Progress, Problems of Women, CHI. 'Tru:B., Mar. 22, 2000, at 2 [hereinafter 
Jones, Moving UP]. "In politics, women have gone from holding congressional offices only 
by succeeding husbands who had died to winning a record number of seats in their own 
right .... " Id. 
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office.93 Gail Collins, an editorial writer for the New York Times, 
weighed in on funding for female politicians, noting: 
[C]ampaign finance reform keeps receding, and some con-
trarians say that Emily's List is one of the reaso~s. That's 
near-heresy: Emily's List, a political action committee that 
"bundles" donations from backers interested in promoting 
Democratic women in politics, has done more than any 
group to put women's campaigns on an equal financial level 
with men's. Still, nearly any discussion of finance reform in-
evitably raises the question of what such reform would do to 
Emily. 94 
While Clift and Brazaitis address Emily's List's influence in elections, 
and the difficulty female candidates have in raising money, the 
authors fail to note that female candidates could have another serious 
setback should banning bundling become a reality.95 
CONCLUSION 
In their book Madam President: Shattering the Last Glass Ceiling, El-
eanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis do an admirable job describing the pit-
falls that line the road to political office for female candidates.96 
While the authors address the challenges female politicians face when 
attempting to attract campaign donations, they do not touch upon 
campaign finance reform and the effects possible alterations in the 
law could have on aspiring female politicians.97 Banning soft money 
and closing the bundling loophole are proposals that have been and 
likely will continue to be presented as viable, meaningful campaign 
93 See Collins, supra note 10, at 54;Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11, at 3; Leonard, supra 
note 11, at A28. The 2000 election brought a record number of female governors, senators 
and congresswomen. Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11; Jones, Moving Up, supra note 92, at 2; 
Jill Lawrence, Women's Numbers Improved the Most in State Elections, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 
1998, at 6A; Leonard, supra note 11, at A28; ELECTION 2000, supra note 11. Women won 
the top five state offices in the 1998 election in Arizona, and in Washington, forty-one per-
cent of the legislature following the 1998 election was comprised of women, a record for 
any state legislature. Lawrence, supra, at 6A; see also Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11, at 3. 
The almost nine million dollars in contributions Emily's List made during the 2000 elec-
tion is likely to have had a significant impact on a large number of female candidates. See 
Jones, Leap Year, supra note 11, at 3. 
94 Collins, supra note 10, at 54. 
95 See generally CLIFf & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1. 
96 See generally id. 
97 See generally id. 
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finance reforms.98 Furthermore, each of these reforms could have a 
serious impact on challenger candidates, particularly female candi-
dates.99 As Gail Collins says, ''The issues that women gravitate toward 
in politics-day care, education, child protection-do not attract a lot 
of big donors. "100 Given this reality, and the fact that any change in 
the current campaign finance laws could have a serious effect on fe-
male candidates, Clift and Brazaitis should have addressed this topic 
in a book that purports to probe all the reasons why women have a 
hard time rising through the political ranks.10l 
98 See sources cited supra note 10. 
99 See sources cited supra note 10. 
100 Collins, supm note 10, at 54. 
101 See sources cited supra note 10. &e generally CLIFT & BRAZAITIS, supra note 1. 
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